The concepts of “end” and “totality” (as well as the relationship that figures between the two) are central to Heidegger’s analysis of death. And yet he wants to disabuse us (as he is wont to do) of thinking about these concepts in a manner that would be altogether unsuitable for his analysis. Indeed, to understand Dasein’s “end” qua perishing, or disappearance, is to lose sight of death, since death, for Heidegger, much like the analytic of Dasein, is to be understood ontologically; that is, as an ontological possibility. Now, it is true that Heidegger acknowledges that his ontological characterization of death “signifies nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical potentiality-for-Being has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself” (Heidegger 1962, 311). As such, I will, in this paper, investigate both the existential and existentiell dimensions of death.

Heidegger begins his analysis of death with a detailed investigation of its character as that which is “outstanding”. To be sure, this is not a quality unique to death, since all the possibilities of Dasein must be similarly outstanding. The crucial difference between death and other possibilities is that death is the only non-actualizable possibility of Dasein— it is that which “is the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all (Heidegger 1962, 307). But if death is a phenomenon that is ontologically constitutive of Dasein, we cannot treat it as though it were yet another “event” in the course of Dasein’s life, nor is understanding death qua the biological cessation of life appropriate for Heidegger’s purposes. Death, rather, is Dasein’s end. However, Dasein does not simply “arrive” at this end, since in arriving at its end Dasein no longer is. This is also why Dasein’s “incompleteness”, its “not-yet” is constitutive of its Being: Dasein cannot be whole, or “together” when death finally displaces this “not-yet” because it is when “this “not-yet” has been filled… that Dasein is no longer” (Heidegger 1962, 287). Dasein, then is never simply at its end but always towards its end: “its “not-yet” belongs to it” (Heidegger 1962, 287).

Heidegger then writes that, “[i]n death, Dasein has not been fulfilled nor has it simply disappeared” (Heidegger 1962, 289). This is a perplexing claim. We know that death is the negation of Dasein since death is the impossibility of Dasein— but there is now a proviso attached to this: negation does not lead to Dasein disappearance. Recall that death is not just the impossibility of Dasein but rather the possibility of this impossibility. As Mark Tanzer argues in “Heidegger on death as a deficient mode”, Dasein is able to retain its ontological identity even in death since “that end is Dasein itself” (Tanzer, 27). The fact that Dasein does not disappear, nor change ontologically in death is what separates it from mere ready-to-hand or present-at-hand objects. For example, if an object loses one of its essential qualities and thereby meets its end, it loses its previous ontological identity (it disappears) and assumes another one (Tanzer, 27). This is, of course, not the case for Dasein— Dasein, paradoxically, does not disappear in the face of its identity-loss. “Death”, writes Heidegger, “is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is” (Heidegger 1962, 289). To say that the end belongs to Dasein, that it is a Being-towards-death, means that this impossibility— death— is structurally, that is, ontologically, inscribed in the very concept of Dasein.

That death reveals itself as Dasein’s “ownmost… non-relational” possibility “which is not to be outstripped” as soon as Dasein is, can be attributed to Dasein’s thrownness (Heidegger 1962, 294). It is entirely possible that Dasein relates to its thrownness into death in a manner which is evasive, so that it can be said of Dasein that it flees from death (Heidegger 1962, 299). This fleeing, of course, does not take the form of a physical action. Dasein, in relating to its death inauthentically, occludes from its view death’s radical singularity, its unrepresentability, and the fact that death always already belongs to it. Rather, it treats death as “just a “case of death””, as though it were reconcilable with the rest of Dasein’s experience. Or perhaps Dasein broods over death, taking it seriously, announcing to himself and others that he is preparing for his death by giving alms and living righteously. This latter way of comporting oneself towards death in a pious manner is no less inauthentic than the former’s “untroubled indifference” (Heidegger 1962, 299). Merely being certain of one’s death does not suffice in relating to death authentically. For in both of these cases, Dasein does not deny the possibility of its death, indeed, it is certain of it (“[n]obody doubts that one dies”), and yet, Dasein flees from it (Heidegger 1962, 299). This cannot be said to be an authentic certainty. To be certain of death in an empirical, or apodictic manner is still to fail to relate to it authentically since death is not an object of theoretical knowledge (Heidegger 1962, 302). Indeed, such certainty is symptomatic of Dasein’s fallenness and, as such, falls short of that “primordial signification”, that is, Being-certain (Heidegger 1962, 300). Heidegger does not treat death as an event that occurs since Dasein is not around to experience its death. Rather, the only possible solution is an understanding of Dasein’s being-towards its end.

To assume this authentic relationship with death, Dasein must be in anticipation. This results in anxiety, which is a result of Dasein’s recognition of the non-relationality of death— a recognition that individualizes Dasein (Heidegger 1962, 308). Moreover, it is precisely anxiety that explodes the horizon of average everydayness, thereby opening up the choice for Dasein to be authentic or inauthentic. If to speak of death “existentially” is to speak of being-towards-death as a universal determination of Dasein, to speak of it “existentielly” is to speak of the specific mode that determines the nature or the character of Dasein’s relationship to death. That is, the existential is basic, while the existentiell is modificatory. Authentic being-towards-death reveals to Dasein its freedom, which is the locus of non-relationality. In this mode, the entirety of the world is understood according to Dasein’s ownmost possibility. One might, at this point, interpret authenticity as a complete negation of the they-self since to be authentic seems to imply complete autonomy and a severance from the influence of others. However, authenticity is only a modification of the way Dasein is with others and is thus not a negation of the they-self. Recall that the they-self is an existential structure and so its negation is impossible: Dasein is the they-self. Authenticity is only a modification of this relation, one however, that Dasein can never maintain for too long. Can one, for example, remain in an authentic mode indefinitely if it is anxiety that allows for one to enter into it? Will Dasein not eventually fall back, so to speak, onto the they-self?

Death, one can say, then, is the principal operator of self-disclosure. The question of “how to be” is only a question that can be asked by Dasein. And, unless it is possible for a being to not be, one cannot ask what it means to be. Death, consequently, is not a defect but is rather the possibility of being authentic. Does Dasein ever take up this challenge? In other words, how does Dasein become authentic? If one searches for, in Being and Time, a propaedeutic to comporting oneself authentically, as though it were a text filled with edifying and instructional ethical propositions, then one has not even begun to understand Heidegger’s intention in writing it. For authenticity is a site of radical indeterminacy, any concrete specification of Dasein’s ownmost possibility would be to slip back into the they-self. In explicating authenticity, Heidegger is only attempting to locate this as a possibility that dasein can demand. The content of this demand, however, is never specifiable.

This demand is produced, according to Heidegger, by the call to conscience. Just as the demand itself, the call has no determinate content. The conscience, as is usually understood, is a faculty of the soul with definitive operations; its activity is prescriptive, resulting in concrete actions. This is not how Heidegger thinks of conscience. Conscience is important to Heidegger’s project insofar as it can motivate Dasein’s authenticity. This is why Heidegger refers to the conscience as “an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (Heidegger 1962, 324). And while conscience, given its relation to authenticity, appears at first to be an individual phenomenon, Heidegger surprisingly writes that “[w]hen Dasein is resolute, it can be the ‘conscience’ of Others” (Heidegger 1962, 344). A Dasein that, through resoluteness, has “chosen” its freedom by overcoming the they-self can assume a position of authority, leading others to heed the call of their conscience. It seems that, according to Heidegger, such an individual bears an enormous responsibility: the establishment of an “authentic” community. As Heidegger writes, “[o]nly by authentically Being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another— not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the “they” and in what “they” want to undertake (Heidegger 1962, 345). But this formulation leaves the reader with various questions, which I will end with. It would appear that the authentic community serves more as a regulative ideal— if authenticity is linked to anxiety such that an individual is never always authentic, could the same not be said of a community? Or is an authentic community established through an elimination of the they-self? In what manner is the authentic individual— supposedly the one who establishes the authentic community— to go about fulfilling his political function?